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CALIFORNIA A.G. OPINES: CALIFORNIA'S
NUCLEAR LEGISLATION UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE NUCLEAR REGULATION:
California Attorney General issues an opinion stating that sections of
the state nuclear legislation are unconstitutional in light of exclusive
federal regulatory authority over radiological hazards and nuclear
power plant development and with respect to the California Con-
stitution.
In a 33-page opinion issued April 25, 1978, California Attorney
General Evelle J. Younger and Assistant Attorney General Willard A.
Shank (A.G.) determined that three sections of the California Public
Resources Code,1 which provide for nuclear power plant regulation,
are unconstitutional under federal preemption principals and in viola-
tion of the California Constitution.
Federal preemption is a constitutional doctrine based on the
United States Constitution's "Supremacy Clause" 2 -which provides
that the Constitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the
land. Once Congress has enacted federal regulatory statutes and has
expressly or implicitly provided for exclusive federal control over an
area, state legislation, whether or not it conflicts with those statutes,
is said to be preempted by the federal laws. The A.G. believes that
Congressional regulation in the field of nuclear energy and power
clearly precludes any state attempts at regulation.
Congressional activity in this area has been extensive. In 1946,
Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 3 which
authorized the first civilian operation of nuclear facilities and vested
total ownership and control of all nuclear materials in that commis-
sion under detailed licensing procedures. In 1954, Congress enacted
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 4 which provided for private owner-
ship of nuclear facilities and source and by-product materials and for
the leasing of special nuclear materials under federal licensing. The
1954 Act was amended in 1959' to allow the AEC to enter into
1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § §25524.1, 25524.2, 25524.3 (West 1977, Supp. 1978).
2. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
3. Ch. 724, 60 STAT. 755 (1946).
4. 42 U.S.C. §2011 (Supp. 1975).
5. Id. at §2021(b).
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agreements with states to transfer AEC regulatory authority over
by-product, source and special nuclear materials. But the 1959
amendments specifically reserved AEC authority over power plant
construction and operation, the import and export of nuclear ma-
terials, and the disposal of nuclear materials by ocean or sea.
In 1974, the AEC was abolished by the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974.6 This 1974 Act created the Energy Resources and
Development Administration (ERDA) to develop nuclear energy and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to license and regulate
nuclear power plants. The California A.G. views the 1974 Act as
merely reorganizational in nature, as a statute which does not affect
federal control of the nuclear area.
The A.G. relies heavily on two cases to illustrate that judicial
interpretation of Congressional action in the nuclear field is in accord
with his opinion. In Northern States Power Company v. Minnesota,'
plaintiff challenged Minnesota legislation which established per-
missable radioactive discharge levels higher than those permitted by
the AEC. The 8th Circuit Court discussed the 1954 Atomic Energy
Act and its subsequent amendments. The court found that the 1959
amendments clearly established two fundamental principals express-
ing Congressional intent with respect to nuclear regulation: first,
"... Congress intended Federal occupancy of regulation over all
radiation hazards except where jurisdiction was expressly ceded to
the states, . . .- 8; second, Congress prohibited the AEC from trans-
ferring to the states its authority over crucial aspects of nuclear
power development. ". . . (T)he Act, as amended, and its legislative
history, when viewed together, provide the strongest manifestation
of Congressional intent to pre-empt the field of regulation over the
construction, and operation of nuclear reactors,..." 9
Minnesota argued, in Northern States, that its statutes were meant
only to regulate "the narrow area of pollution control,"'  a per-
missible exercise of the state's police power to regulate in areas con-
cerning its citizens' health and safety. That claim was rejected by the
court. Pollution control, the court stated, was an area which could
not be separated from the broader field of nuclear power plant
regulation. The Minnesota scheme led to a dual system of state and
6. 5 U.S.C. §§5313-5316 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§5801, 5811-5820, 5841-5849,
5871-5879, 5891 (Supp. 1975).
7. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
8. Id. at 1150.
9. Id. at 1152.
10. Id. at 1153.
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federal control which could possibly lead to interference with federal
authority, therefore, federal preemption is mandated.
The Supreme Court upheld the Northern States decision,'1 and
unanimously reaffirmed that holding in Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group. 12 In that case, a citizens group brought
suit against Russell Train, Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, for his refusal to regulate discharge of nuclear ma-
terials pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)." At issue was whether the FWPCA's regulation of
"pollutants" applied to nuclear materials. In reviewing the legislative
history of the FWPCA, Justice Marshall examined the transcript of a
discussion between Senators Muskie and Pastore which dealt with
possible conflicts between the Atomic Energy Act and FWPCA.
Senator Muskie maintained that the proposed FWPCA was not
intended to affect the Atomic Energy Act. Justice Marshall inter-
preted these assurances, along with the Senators' references to the
8th Circuit's Northern States decision, to mean both that the AEC
regulatory authority was not affected by any FWPCA regulations and
that radioactive materials discharge was not within the scope of the
FWPCA.
The California nuclear legislation in question is part of the
Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Act (Warren-Alquist Act)." 4 Chapter 6 of the Warren-Alquist
Act created the Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission (Commission), an agency charged with the review of
various factors related to the construction and development of each
proposed nuclear power plant in the state.
Section 25524.1 of the Warren-Alquist Act deals with nuclear
fission thermal power plants, which require the reprocessing of fuel
rods. To certify these power plants, the Commission must first find
".... that the United States, through its authorized agency, has iden-
tified and approved, and there exists a technology for the construc-
tion and operation of, nuclear fuel rod reprocessing plants."' s The
Commission must then report its findings to the state legislature,
which has 100 legislative days to disaffirm the findings by a majority
vote. A veto by the legislature of the Commission's findings stops the
certification of the nuclear power plant. Section 25524.2 deals with
11. Aff'dmem 405 U.S. 1035 (1971).
12. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
13. 33 U.S.C. §§11S7,1158 (1976).
14. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § § 25000-25968 (West 1977, Supp. 1978).
15. Id. at §25524.1.
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high level nuclear waste disposal and bars certification of any nuclear
power plant unless the Commission finds ". . . that there exists a
demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level
nuclear waste." ' 6 This section also requires that the Commission's
findings be reported to the legislature, which can disaffirm the find-
ings and halt certification. Section 25524.3 authorizes the Commis-
sion to evaluate the necessity for and effectiveness of underground
and berm containment of nuclear reactors before certifying the
nuclear facilities.
The A.G. concluded that Sections 25524.1, 25524.2, and 25524.3
of the Warren-Alquist Act are unconstitutional on their face for two
reasons. First, these provisions assert California's regulatory author-
ity over radiological hazards. Both the Northern States and Train
decisions and Congressional activity in this area clearly demonstrate
that federal control of the nuclear field is a given. Second, these
provisions permit the Commission and the California legislature to
withhold certification from proposed power plants. While these pro-
cedures purport to impose a temporary moratorium on power plant
construction, they effectively provide a mechanism for permanently
blocking facility development. Thus, the certification scheme is con-
trary to Congress's expressly declared goals of fostering and encour-
aging development, construction, and use of nuclear power plants., 7
These sections of the Warren-Alquist Act authorize either house of
the California legislature to adopt resolutions disaffirming the
Commission's findings which permit the certification process of a
nuclear power plant to continue. In effect, this one-house veto can
prohibit power plant certification. The A.G. determined that this is a
form of law making that encroaches on the legislative powers of both
the California Governor and the other house, and therefore violative
of the California Constitution. 1 8
The issues raised in this opinion pose the old question of federal/
state power distribution in the relatively new setting of nuclear
energy regulation. For example, health and safety concerns have
been traditional areas of state regulation. The public welfare can be
more effectively evaluated and policed by state and local govern-
ments, which are more attuned to the particular needs of the people
in each state. But by assuming exclusive control of both radiological
hazards and nuclear power plant development and construction, the
16. Id. at §25524.2.
17. Op. Att'y. Gen. Cal. No. 77/50 at 1 (April 25, 1978).
18. Id. at 29.
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federal government has supplanted a portion of the states' police
powers.
No court has yet addressed the question of whether or not a state
may elect to exclude nuclear facilities or nuclear waste storage sites
from its boundaries altogether. Some states are currently moving in
that direction. It remains to be seen whether states' rights in this area
will be upheld.
VICKIE GABIN
